Env Secrets Manager
npx machina-cli add skill alirezarezvani/claude-skills/env-secrets-manager --openclawEnv & Secrets Manager
Tier: POWERFUL Category: Engineering Domain: Security / DevOps / Configuration Management
Overview
Complete environment and secrets management workflow: .env file lifecycle across dev/staging/prod, .env.example auto-generation, required-var validation, secret leak detection in git history, and credential rotation playbook. Integrates with HashiCorp Vault, AWS SSM, 1Password CLI, and Doppler.
Core Capabilities
- .env lifecycle — create, validate, sync across environments
- .env.example generation — strip values, preserve keys and comments
- Validation script — fail-fast on missing required vars at startup
- Secret leak detection — regex scan of git history and working tree
- Rotation workflow — detect → scope → rotate → deploy → verify
- Secret manager integrations — Vault KV v2, AWS SSM, 1Password, Doppler
When to Use
- Setting up a new project — scaffold .env.example and validation
- Before every commit — scan for accidentally staged secrets
- Post-incident response — leaked credential rotation procedure
- Onboarding new developers — they need all vars, not just some
- Environment drift investigation — prod behaving differently from staging
.env File Structure
Canonical Layout
# .env.example — committed to git (no values)
# .env.local — developer machine (gitignored)
# .env.staging — CI/CD or secret manager reference
# .env.prod — never on disk; pulled from secret manager at runtime
# Application
APP_NAME=
APP_ENV= # dev | staging | prod
APP_PORT=3000 # default port if not set
APP_SECRET= # REQUIRED: JWT signing secret (min 32 chars)
APP_URL= # REQUIRED: public base URL
# Database
DATABASE_URL= # REQUIRED: full connection string
DATABASE_POOL_MIN=2
DATABASE_POOL_MAX=10
# Auth
AUTH_JWT_SECRET= # REQUIRED
AUTH_JWT_EXPIRY=3600 # seconds
AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET= # REQUIRED
# Third-party APIs
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY= # REQUIRED in prod
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET= # REQUIRED in prod
SENDGRID_API_KEY=
# Storage
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
AWS_REGION=eu-central-1
AWS_S3_BUCKET=
# Monitoring
SENTRY_DSN=
DD_API_KEY=
.gitignore Patterns
Add to your project's .gitignore:
# Environment files — NEVER commit these
.env
.env.local
.env.development
.env.development.local
.env.test.local
.env.staging
.env.staging.local
.env.production
.env.production.local
.env.prod
.env.*.local
# Secret files
*.pem
*.key
*.p12
*.pfx
secrets.json
secrets.yaml
secrets.yml
credentials.json
service-account.json
# AWS
.aws/credentials
# Terraform state (may contain secrets)
*.tfstate
*.tfstate.backup
.terraform/
# Kubernetes secrets
*-secret.yaml
*-secrets.yaml
.env.example Auto-Generation
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/gen-env-example.sh
# Strips values from .env, preserves keys, defaults, and comments
INPUT="${1:-.env}"
OUTPUT="${2:-.env.example}"
if [ ! -f "$INPUT" ]; then
echo "ERROR: $INPUT not found"
exit 1
fi
python3 - "$INPUT" "$OUTPUT" << 'PYEOF'
import sys, re
input_file = sys.argv[1]
output_file = sys.argv[2]
lines = []
with open(input_file) as f:
for line in f:
stripped = line.rstrip('\n')
# Keep blank lines and comments as-is
if stripped == '' or stripped.startswith('#'):
lines.append(stripped)
continue
# Match KEY=VALUE or KEY="VALUE"
m = re.match(r'^([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$', stripped)
if m:
key = m.group(1)
value = m.group(2).strip('"\'')
# Keep non-sensitive defaults (ports, regions, feature flags)
safe_defaults = re.compile(
r'^(APP_PORT|APP_ENV|APP_NAME|AWS_REGION|DATABASE_POOL_|LOG_LEVEL|'
r'FEATURE_|CACHE_TTL|RATE_LIMIT_|PAGINATION_|TIMEOUT_)',
re.I
)
sensitive = re.compile(
r'(SECRET|KEY|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PASS|CREDENTIAL|DSN|AUTH|PRIVATE|CERT)',
re.I
)
if safe_defaults.match(key) and value:
lines.append(f"{key}={value} # default")
else:
lines.append(f"{key}=")
else:
lines.append(stripped)
with open(output_file, 'w') as f:
f.write('\n'.join(lines) + '\n')
print(f"Generated {output_file} from {input_file}")
PYEOF
Usage:
bash scripts/gen-env-example.sh .env .env.example
# Commit .env.example, never .env
git add .env.example
Required Variable Validation Script
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/validate-env.sh
# Run at app startup or in CI before deploy
# Exit 1 if any required var is missing or empty
set -euo pipefail
MISSING=()
WARNINGS=()
# --- Define required vars by environment ---
ALWAYS_REQUIRED=(
APP_SECRET
APP_URL
DATABASE_URL
AUTH_JWT_SECRET
AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET
)
PROD_REQUIRED=(
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET
SENTRY_DSN
)
# --- Check always-required vars ---
for var in "${ALWAYS_REQUIRED[@]}"; do
if [ -z "${!var:-}" ]; then
MISSING+=("$var")
fi
done
# --- Check prod-only vars ---
if [ "${APP_ENV:-}" = "production" ] || [ "${NODE_ENV:-}" = "production" ]; then
for var in "${PROD_REQUIRED[@]}"; do
if [ -z "${!var:-}" ]; then
MISSING+=("$var (required in production)")
fi
done
fi
# --- Validate format/length constraints ---
if [ -n "${AUTH_JWT_SECRET:-}" ] && [ ${#AUTH_JWT_SECRET} -lt 32 ]; then
WARNINGS+=("AUTH_JWT_SECRET is shorter than 32 chars — insecure")
fi
if [ -n "${DATABASE_URL:-}" ]; then
if ! echo "$DATABASE_URL" | grep -qE "^(postgres|postgresql|mysql|mongodb|redis)://"; then
WARNINGS+=("DATABASE_URL doesn't look like a valid connection string")
fi
fi
if [ -n "${APP_PORT:-}" ]; then
if ! [[ "$APP_PORT" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || [ "$APP_PORT" -lt 1 ] || [ "$APP_PORT" -gt 65535 ]; then
WARNINGS+=("APP_PORT=$APP_PORT is not a valid port number")
fi
fi
# --- Report ---
if [ ${#WARNINGS[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
echo "WARNINGS:"
for w in "${WARNINGS[@]}"; do
echo " ⚠️ $w"
done
fi
if [ ${#MISSING[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "FATAL: Missing required environment variables:"
for var in "${MISSING[@]}"; do
echo " ❌ $var"
done
echo ""
echo "Copy .env.example to .env and fill in missing values."
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ All required environment variables are set"
Node.js equivalent:
// src/config/validateEnv.ts
const required = [
'APP_SECRET', 'APP_URL', 'DATABASE_URL',
'AUTH_JWT_SECRET', 'AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET',
]
const missing = required.filter(key => !process.env[key])
if (missing.length > 0) {
console.error('FATAL: Missing required environment variables:', missing)
process.exit(1)
}
if (process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET && process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET.length < 32) {
console.error('FATAL: AUTH_JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters')
process.exit(1)
}
export const config = {
appSecret: process.env.APP_SECRET!,
appUrl: process.env.APP_URL!,
databaseUrl: process.env.DATABASE_URL!,
jwtSecret: process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET!,
refreshSecret: process.env.AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET!,
stripeKey: process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY, // optional
port: parseInt(process.env.APP_PORT ?? '3000', 10),
} as const
Secret Leak Detection
Scan Working Tree
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/scan-secrets.sh
# Scan staged files and working tree for common secret patterns
FAIL=0
check() {
local label="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local matches
matches=$(git diff --cached -U0 2>/dev/null | grep "^+" | grep -vE "^(\+\+\+|#|\/\/)" | \
grep -E "$pattern" | grep -v ".env.example" | grep -v "test\|mock\|fixture\|fake" || true)
if [ -n "$matches" ]; then
echo "SECRET DETECTED [$label]:"
echo "$matches" | head -5
FAIL=1
fi
}
# AWS Access Keys
check "AWS Access Key" "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
check "AWS Secret Key" "aws_secret_access_key\s*=\s*['\"]?[A-Za-z0-9/+]{40}"
# Stripe
check "Stripe Live Key" "sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
check "Stripe Test Key" "sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
check "Stripe Webhook" "whsec_[0-9a-zA-Z]{32,}"
# JWT / Generic secrets
check "Hardcoded JWT" "eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"
check "Generic Secret" "(secret|password|passwd|api_key|apikey|token)\s*[:=]\s*['\"][^'\"]{12,}['\"]"
# Private keys
check "Private Key Block" "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"
check "PEM Certificate" "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"
# Connection strings with credentials
check "DB Connection" "(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^:]+:[^@]+@"
check "Redis Auth" "redis://:[^@]+@\|rediss://:[^@]+@"
# Google
check "Google API Key" "AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
check "Google OAuth" "[0-9]+-[0-9A-Za-z_]{32}\.apps\.googleusercontent\.com"
# GitHub
check "GitHub Token" "gh[ps]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}"
check "GitHub Fine-grained" "github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}"
# Slack
check "Slack Token" "xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z]{10,}"
check "Slack Webhook" "https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Z0-9]{9,}/[A-Z0-9]{9,}/[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}"
# Twilio
check "Twilio SID" "AC[a-z0-9]{32}"
check "Twilio Token" "SK[a-z0-9]{32}"
if [ $FAIL -eq 1 ]; then
echo ""
echo "BLOCKED: Secrets detected in staged changes."
echo "Remove secrets before committing. Use environment variables instead."
echo "If this is a false positive, add it to .secretsignore or use:"
echo " git commit --no-verify (only if you're 100% certain it's safe)"
exit 1
fi
echo "No secrets detected in staged changes."
Scan Git History (post-incident)
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/scan-history.sh — scan entire git history for leaked secrets
PATTERNS=(
"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
"sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}"
"sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}"
"-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----"
"AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
"xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z]{10,}"
)
for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
echo "Scanning for: $pattern"
git log --all -p --no-color 2>/dev/null | \
grep -n "$pattern" | \
grep "^+" | \
grep -v "^+++" | \
head -10
done
# Alternative: use truffleHog or gitleaks for comprehensive scanning
# gitleaks detect --source . --log-opts="--all"
# trufflehog git file://. --only-verified
Pre-commit Hook Installation
#!/bin/bash
# Install the pre-commit hook
HOOK_PATH=".git/hooks/pre-commit"
cat > "$HOOK_PATH" << 'HOOK'
#!/bin/bash
# Pre-commit: scan for secrets before every commit
SCRIPT="scripts/scan-secrets.sh"
if [ -f "$SCRIPT" ]; then
bash "$SCRIPT"
else
# Inline fallback if script not present
if git diff --cached -U0 | grep "^+" | grep -qE "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|sk_live_|-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY"; then
echo "BLOCKED: Possible secret detected in staged changes."
exit 1
fi
fi
HOOK
chmod +x "$HOOK_PATH"
echo "Pre-commit hook installed at $HOOK_PATH"
Using pre-commit framework (recommended for teams):
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
rev: v8.18.0
hooks:
- id: gitleaks
- repo: local
hooks:
- id: validate-env-example
name: Check .env.example is up to date
language: script
entry: bash scripts/check-env-example.sh
pass_filenames: false
Credential Rotation Workflow
When a secret is leaked or compromised:
Step 1 — Detect & Confirm
# Confirm which secret was exposed
git log --all -p --no-color | grep -A2 -B2 "AKIA\|sk_live_\|SECRET"
# Check if secret is in any open PRs
gh pr list --state open | while read pr; do
gh pr diff $(echo $pr | awk '{print $1}') | grep -E "AKIA|sk_live_" && echo "Found in PR: $pr"
done
Step 2 — Identify Exposure Window
# Find first commit that introduced the secret
git log --all -p --no-color -- "*.env" "*.json" "*.yaml" "*.ts" "*.py" | \
grep -B 10 "THE_LEAKED_VALUE" | grep "^commit" | tail -1
# Get commit date
git show --format="%ci" COMMIT_HASH | head -1
# Check if secret appears in public repos (GitHub)
gh api search/code -X GET -f q="THE_LEAKED_VALUE" | jq '.total_count, .items[].html_url'
Step 3 — Rotate Credential
Per service — rotate immediately:
- AWS: IAM console → delete access key → create new → update everywhere
- Stripe: Dashboard → Developers → API keys → Roll key
- GitHub PAT: Settings → Developer Settings → Personal access tokens → Revoke → Create new
- DB password:
ALTER USER app_user PASSWORD 'new-strong-password-here'; - JWT secret: Rotate key (all existing sessions invalidated — users re-login)
Step 4 — Update All Environments
# Update secret manager (source of truth)
# Then redeploy to pull new values
# Vault KV v2
vault kv put secret/myapp/prod \
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="sk_live_NEW..." \
APP_SECRET="new-secret-here"
# AWS SSM
aws ssm put-parameter \
--name "/myapp/prod/STRIPE_SECRET_KEY" \
--value "sk_live_NEW..." \
--type "SecureString" \
--overwrite
# 1Password
op item edit "MyApp Prod" \
--field "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY[password]=sk_live_NEW..."
# Doppler
doppler secrets set STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="sk_live_NEW..." --project myapp --config prod
Step 5 — Remove from Git History
# WARNING: rewrites history — coordinate with team first
git filter-repo --path-glob "*.env" --invert-paths
# Or remove specific string from all commits
git filter-repo --replace-text <(echo "LEAKED_VALUE==>REDACTED")
# Force push all branches (requires team coordination + force push permissions)
git push origin --force --all
# Notify all developers to re-clone
Step 6 — Verify
# Confirm secret no longer in history
git log --all -p | grep "LEAKED_VALUE" | wc -l # should be 0
# Test new credentials work
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $NEW_TOKEN" https://api.service.com/test
# Monitor for unauthorized usage of old credential (check service audit logs)
Secret Manager Integrations
HashiCorp Vault KV v2
# Setup
export VAULT_ADDR="https://vault.internal.company.com"
export VAULT_TOKEN="$(vault login -method=oidc -format=json | jq -r '.auth.client_token')"
# Write secrets
vault kv put secret/myapp/prod \
DATABASE_URL="postgres://user:pass@host/db" \
APP_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 32)"
# Read secrets into env
eval $(vault kv get -format=json secret/myapp/prod | \
jq -r '.data.data | to_entries[] | "export \(.key)=\(.value)"')
# In CI/CD (GitHub Actions)
# Use vault-action: hashicorp/vault-action@v2
AWS SSM Parameter Store
# Write (SecureString = encrypted with KMS)
aws ssm put-parameter \
--name "/myapp/prod/DATABASE_URL" \
--value "postgres://..." \
--type "SecureString" \
--key-id "alias/myapp-secrets"
# Read all params for an app/env into shell
eval $(aws ssm get-parameters-by-path \
--path "/myapp/prod/" \
--with-decryption \
--query "Parameters[*].[Name,Value]" \
--output text | \
awk '{split($1,a,"/"); print "export " a[length(a)] "=\"" $2 "\""}')
# In Node.js at startup
# Use @aws-sdk/client-ssm to pull params before server starts
1Password CLI
# Authenticate
eval $(op signin)
# Get a specific field
op read "op://MyVault/MyApp Prod/STRIPE_SECRET_KEY"
# Export all fields from an item as env vars
op item get "MyApp Prod" --format json | \
jq -r '.fields[] | select(.value != null) | "export \(.label)=\"\(.value)\""' | \
grep -E "^export [A-Z_]+" | source /dev/stdin
# .env injection
op inject -i .env.tpl -o .env
# .env.tpl uses {{ op://Vault/Item/field }} syntax
Doppler
# Setup
doppler setup # interactive: select project + config
# Run any command with secrets injected
doppler run -- node server.js
doppler run -- npm run dev
# Export to .env (local dev only — never commit output)
doppler secrets download --no-file --format env > .env.local
# Pull specific secret
doppler secrets get DATABASE_URL --plain
# Sync to another environment
doppler secrets upload --project myapp --config staging < .env.staging.example
Environment Drift Detection
Check if staging and prod have the same set of keys (values may differ):
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/check-env-drift.sh
# Pull key names from both environments (not values)
STAGING_KEYS=$(doppler secrets --project myapp --config staging --format json 2>/dev/null | \
jq -r 'keys[]' | sort)
PROD_KEYS=$(doppler secrets --project myapp --config prod --format json 2>/dev/null | \
jq -r 'keys[]' | sort)
ONLY_IN_STAGING=$(comm -23 <(echo "$STAGING_KEYS") <(echo "$PROD_KEYS"))
ONLY_IN_PROD=$(comm -13 <(echo "$STAGING_KEYS") <(echo "$PROD_KEYS"))
if [ -n "$ONLY_IN_STAGING" ]; then
echo "Keys in STAGING but NOT in PROD:"
echo "$ONLY_IN_STAGING" | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
if [ -n "$ONLY_IN_PROD" ]; then
echo "Keys in PROD but NOT in STAGING:"
echo "$ONLY_IN_PROD" | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
if [ -z "$ONLY_IN_STAGING" ] && [ -z "$ONLY_IN_PROD" ]; then
echo "✅ No env drift detected — staging and prod have identical key sets"
fi
Common Pitfalls
- Committing .env instead of .env.example — add
.envto .gitignore on day 1; use pre-commit hooks - Storing secrets in CI/CD logs — never
echo $SECRET; mask vars in CI settings - Rotating only one place — secrets often appear in Heroku, Vercel, Docker, K8s, CI — update ALL
- Forgetting to invalidate sessions after JWT secret rotation — all users will be logged out; communicate this
- Using .env.example with real values — example files are public; strip everything sensitive
- Not monitoring after rotation — watch audit logs for 24h after rotation to catch unauthorized old-credential use
- Weak secrets —
APP_SECRET=mysecretis not a secret. Useopenssl rand -base64 32
Best Practices
- Secret manager is source of truth — .env files are for local dev only; never in prod
- Rotate on a schedule, not just after incidents — quarterly minimum for long-lived keys
- Principle of least privilege — each service gets its own API key with minimal permissions
- Audit access — log every secret read in Vault/SSM; alert on anomalous access
- Never log secrets — add log scrubbing middleware that redacts known secret patterns
- Use short-lived credentials — prefer OIDC/instance roles over long-lived access keys
- Separate secrets per environment — never share a key between dev and prod
- Document rotation runbooks — before an incident, not during one
Source
git clone https://github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills/blob/main/engineering/env-secrets-manager/SKILL.mdView on GitHub Overview
Provides a complete environment and secrets management workflow across dev, staging, and prod, including .env lifecycle, automatic .env.example generation, required-var validation, secret leak detection in git history, and a rotation playbook. It integrates with HashiCorp Vault, AWS SSM, 1Password CLI, and Doppler to centralize secret management and runtime retrieval.
How This Skill Works
The skill orchestrates environment and secrets workflows: it manages the .env lifecycle (create, validate, sync across environments), auto-generates .env.example by stripping values while preserving keys and comments, and runs a regex-based secret leak scan on git history and the working tree. It also implements a rotation workflow (detect → scope → rotate → deploy → verify) and wires into secret managers like Vault KV v2, AWS SSM, 1Password, and Doppler for secure storage and retrieval.
When to Use It
- Setting up a new project — scaffold .env.example and validation
- Before every commit — scan for accidentally staged secrets
- Post-incident response — leaked credential rotation procedure
- Onboarding new developers — they need all vars, not just some
- Environment drift investigation — prod behaving differently from staging
Quick Start
- Step 1: Scaffold .env.example and enable required-var validation for the project
- Step 2: Configure secret manager integrations (Vault, AWS SSM, 1Password CLI, Doppler) and set runtime references
- Step 3: Regularly run leak scans and, when needed, execute the rotation workflow to rotate and verify secrets
Best Practices
- Scaffold .env.example and enable required-var validation at project start
- Use .env.example auto-generation to keep samples up-to-date while stripping sensitive values
- Run secret leak detection before commits to catch accidental secrets
- Apply the rotation workflow for any credential change or leak, following detect → scope → rotate → deploy → verify
- Integrate with Vault, AWS SSM, 1Password CLI, and Doppler to centralize secrets and enable secure runtime retrieval
Example Use Cases
- Scaffold a new project by generating .env.example and enabling validation
- Run a pre-commit scan to detect accidentally staged secrets
- Perform post-incident credential rotation using the rotation workflow
- Onboard a developer and grant access to all required environment variables via the secret manager
- Investigate prod vs. staging drift by validating environment variables against the canonical .env.example